A local-first control plane for AI agents — see what they do, approve what matters, keep secrets out.
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AI agents (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Zed, Kimi CLI, ZCode, pi, browser assistants) call tools, read files, hit APIs, and paste into web UIs on your behalf. That power is useful — and risky. Vigils sits between your agents and the tools/data they touch, and it is local-first: your prompts, secrets, and audit trail never leave your machine.
AI agent ──▶ ┌─────────────────── Vigils ───────────────────┐ ──▶ tools / data
(MCP client) │ redact → firewall → approve → sandbox → audit │ (MCP servers,
└───────────────────────────────────────────────┘ files, APIs, web)
Four guarantees, enforced locally:
| Guarantee | How |
|---|---|
| See what the agent did | Every tool call is recorded in a tamper-evident SHA-256 hash-chained ledger with full-text search. |
| Approve risky actions first | Destructive / sensitive calls pause for human review in an Approval Queue, with per-agent policy and scoped grants. |
| Keep credentials out of prompts / logs / UI | A redaction engine strips secrets and PII (hard-fingerprint rules + an optional ML ensemble) before text reaches a model, a log, or the screen. |
| Contain & roll back | The ledger is traceable end-to-end and the sandbox runner is fail-closed by default (Wasm + native + Linux Landlock). |